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Abstract
Using a sample of almost 600 banks in Latin America, we show that capital account
liberalization lowers the share of equity and raises the share of interbank funding in total
liabilities of the consolidated banking system. These shifts are mostly due to large banks;
smaller banks, instead, increase their resort to retail funding by offering higher average de-
posit interest rates than larger banks. We also find significant differences in the behavior of
foreign banks and of banks with seemingly greater information opacity. These findings have
positive implications for macro-prudential regulation.
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1 Introduction
Lower controls on a country’s capital account can increase the conditional probability of
macro-financial crises by facilitating the accumulation of foreign liabilities (Reinhart and
Rogoff, 2008; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Catão and Milesi-Ferretti, 2014).1 In ex-
amining the channels through which large capital inflows raise crisis risk, various papers
have looked at the role of bank lending to the private sector and the government—flows
that lie squarely on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets (Popov and Udell, 2012; Jordà
et al., 2013; Taylor, 2015; Ongena et al., 2015; Correa et al., 2015; Dinger and te Kaat,
2016; Hoffmann and Stewen, 2016; Temesvary et al., 2018; Morais et al., forthcoming).
Little attention is given to banks’ funding structures and how they respond to surges in
foreign capital flows. An exception is Bruno and Shin (2015a, 2015b), who show that
higher (lower) borrowing by multinational banks from US dollar-denominated wholesale
funding markets raise (lower) leverage and lending by local banks during periods of low
(high) global interest rates. Their empirical analysis, however, does not look at the role of
capital control regulations and focuses on international capital flows across consolidated
banking systems employing macro-level data. Thus, they do not examine how changes
in capital controls and/or in global liquidity affect the liability structures of distinct tiers
of the local banking system, nor how those effects vary with main bank-specific features
(e.g., size, foreign ownership and the opaqueness of balance sheets), which are clearly
relevant for systemic risk assessment and hence for prudential regulation.
Scarce analysis of the relationship between capital controls and the composition of
bank liabilities is also apparent in three other strands of the empirical literature on macro-
financial linkages. One strand is that comprised by a handful of studies on the determi-
nants of banks’ funding decisions in general, which gloss over how such decisions are
affected by international capital controls (Song and Thakor, 2007; Berger and Bouwman,
2009; Dinger and von Hagen, 2009; Hahm et al., 2013; Craig and Dinger, 2014). Another
strand comprises numerous works on the effects of capital account liberalization/capital
controls on the real economy (Henry, 2003; Voth, 2003; Henry, 2007; Kose et al., 2009;
Levchenko et al., 2009; Larrain and Stumpner, 2017), and on the relationship between ex-
1In this paper, the capital account encompasses what the IMF in its Balance of Payments and Interna-
tional Investment Position Manual (sixth edition) calls financial account.
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ternal financial openness and financial sector outcomes (Daniel and Jones, 2007; Baskaya
et al., 2017; Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2017), none of which zoom in on shifts in the
liability composition of banks following capital account liberalization. Finally, there are
studies relating capital account liberalization and the funding ratios of non-financial cor-
porates in emerging market economies which, by design, exclude bank data (Agca et al.,
2007; Lucey and Zhang, 2011).
This paper aims to fill some of this gap in the literature. From a theoretical perspec-
tive, capital account liberalization is likely to affect the composition of banks’ liabilities
by changing the relative costs of the different types of funding and by facilitating foreign
investors to take positions in domestic banks. One might expect that resort to cheaper for-
eign borrowing may crowd-out resort to domestic borrowing (and most notably domestic
retail deposits) and that greater access to equity financing from abroad may change in-
centives to build capital buffers. No less importantly perhaps, the type of investor and his
information set may matter even more. In particular, to the extent that information on the
domestic bank is more costly or simply unavailable to the foreign investor and that the
latter becomes a bigger player in funding markets, the degree of asymmetric information
between banks and their investors rises. Such a rise in asymmetric information lowers
the cost of funding sources that are less sensitive to information asymmetries, such as
short-term debt, relative to long-term debt and equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Indeed,
evidence from the behavior of broad stock price indices and bond spreads following ma-
jor capital account liberalizations is consistent with this conjecture (Stulz, 1999; Bekaert
and Harvey, 2000), as is the evidence that short-term debt flows are the dominant type of
cross-border capital flows to emerging market economies (e.g., Henry, 2007; Kose et al.,
2009).2 From the point of view of the foreign investor’s supply of funds, it should also be
expected that banks that are foreign-owned, larger, and with less opaque balance sheets
(as proxied for instance by the share of non-performing loans in their portfolio) should
experience a stronger push factor relative to others. Overall, there are thus good reasons
to expect significant effects on the liability structure of banks.
Employing bank-level data from Latin America over the 1995-2013 period, this pa-
2Studies in non-bank corporate finance also find empirical support for a shift towards short-term debt
due to informational frictions that change the relative costs of funding (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Johnson,
2015).
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per examines the evidence and above hypotheses regarding possible connections between
capital controls and changes in the funding structures of banks. Latin America is particu-
larly suitable for this investigation because extensive liberalization in external capital ac-
counts was far-reaching and displayed considerable cross-country heterogeneity through
the 1990s and 2000s, aiding identification of its effects on banks’ funding structures using
panel data. At the same time, restricting the sample to a single region like Latin America
helps filter out the effect of potentially powerful region-specific factors emphasized in
Cerutti et al. (2015), which would call for more evolved and (arguably) less consensual
model restrictions to help identification of regional factors.
We investigate balance sheet effects by breaking down bank liabilities into equity, re-
tail deposits, interbank loans, other short-term debt, bonds and non-interest liabilities, all
expressed as ratios over total assets. In light of a distinguished literature on the role of
foreign interest rates on capital inflows and financial fragility build-ups in emerging mar-
kets, we also partition our sample into capital account liberalization spells during low vs.
high global interest rates. Cross-sectionally, we also partition the sample between smaller
and larger banks, foreign-owned and domestic banks and those that have seemingly more
and less opaque balance sheets—at the same time, we control for other macroeconomic
and regulatory influences throughout. To conduct this exercise, a main contribution of this
paper lies in a novel data set matching bank-level data from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope
database for 17 Latin American countries (covering 81% of total bank assets reported in
the International Financial Statistics) with the new country-level index of financial open-
ness by Fernández et al. (2016) and a host of other macroeconomic controls. Unlike pre-
vious indices of capital controls, the Fernández et al. (2016) index distinguishes between
regulatory controls on capital inflows vs. capital outflows. This distinction is important
as the task at hand is to evaluate the effects of regulatory changes in capital controls on
actual external borrowing by domestic banks and the composition of such borrowing.
Our findings are as follows. At the macro-level, we document that a capital account
liberalization event, defined as a one-standard deviation (henceforth sd) or higher increase
in a country’s de-jure capital account openness index, is associated with lower capital-to-
asset ratios and increases in banks’ interbank liabilities. All other liability side variables
are mostly unaffected. Regarding causality, we not only provide evidence on the exo-
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geneity of capital account liberalization episodes with respect to banks’ funding behav-
ior, but also argue that—even if the exogeneity of external financial liberalization were
unwarranted—the micro panel heterogeneity of our data corroborates the econometric
identification of causal effects. On this basis, we obtain that, in the short-run, a one-sd
increase in capital account openness is associated with 0.31 pp reductions in banks’ eq-
uity ratios and 0.38 pp higher interbank funding ratios. The respective long-run effects
are 1.1 pp (for capital-to-asset ratios) and 2.6 pp (for interbank liabilities). The economic
significance of these results has been fleshed out in previous work: according to the ECB
(2015), for instance, a one-pp decrease in the Tier 1 capital ratios raises the odds ratio (the
probability of distress relative to non-distress) by 35-39% (see also Altunbas et al., 2014).
We show further that the significance of these effects is dominated by periods of high
real domestic money market interest rate spreads relative to the world’s main financial
center—the US. Specifically, the documented shifts in the liability composition of banks
are largely a preserve of capital account liberalization measures enacted during periods of
low US interest rates. Important results also arise from the interaction of capital account
openness with (i) banks’ total assets (to capture that the information availability to outside
investors is increasing in bank size); (ii) a foreign ownership dummy (foreign ownership
reduces the informational frictions between global investors and banks); and (iii) the ratio
of impaired loans relative to equity (banks with lower credit risks typically have a less
opaque balance sheet). It turns out that larger, foreign-owned and informationally less
opaque banks raise their interbank liabilities and lower their capital-to-asset ratios dispro-
portionately more. While the latter possibly reflects their higher regulatory margins to
reduce capital ratios, it also appears to reflect wider access to cheaper interbank funding,
leading to a substitution of less risky funding (capital) with higher risk funding (interbank
borrowing). The result on the greater importance of larger banks in heightening aggre-
gate financial risk is broadly in line with the findings of Baskaya et al. (2017), who show
that higher credit growth in Turkey is mostly driven by bursts of foreign capital inflows
channeled through larger banks, responding to a supply-side capital push external to the
country. In contrast, smaller banks increase their reliance on retail deposits in the wake of
capital account liberalizations. This seems to reflect lower deposit interest rate offered by
larger banks as they can more easily tap external financing sources, leading to the migra-
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tion of deposits to smaller banks. Thus, changes in capital controls produce shifts in the
liability structures and funding risk across distinct tiers of the domestic banking system.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the insti-
tutional setting and trends in capital account liberalization in Latin America. Section
3 presents the data set and summary statistics and Section 4 the main stylized macro
facts. Section 5 lays out the econometric methodology and reports our baseline results.
In Section 6, we test whether our baseline results are amplified by less opaque banks.
The effects on smaller banks are investigated in Section 7. Section 8 performs various
robustness checks. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background Facts
Figure 1 displays the average degree of capital account openness over the period of 1980-
2013, and the corresponding one-sd bands around the mean.
Figure 1: The blue solid line displays the average degree of capital account openness
(proxied by the overall Schindler index from Fernández et al., 2016) in Latin America
over the 1980-2013 period, using the Quinn (1997) index to extrapolate it backwards
until 1980. The dashed lines are the corresponding one-sd bands around the mean. The
dotted line depicts the inflow-only component of the Schindler index.
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The reduction in capital controls in Latin America trended up between the early 1990s
through 2007, and has been partly reversed since the onset of the global financial crisis.
The wide standard deviation bands also indicate that there is significant cross-country
variation in external financial openness. This contrasts with the experience of other
emerging market regions of Asia and Central and Eastern Europe, where the cross-country
variation was about one-half lower.3
In much of the region, the trend towards greater external financial liberalization has
been motivated by a less pressing need to generate external trade surpluses to repay exter-
nal debt in the wake of debt write-offs and debt settlement with foreign creditors, which
started re-pulling capital back in from the early 1990s. In countries with IMF programs,
those were an additional prodding force. Another determinant was a global trend towards
external financial liberalization, which started in advanced countries—notably, the US
and the UK—earlier in the 1980s. Furthermore, as argued by Brooks (2004), the political
orientation of the incumbent government appears to have been a significant determinant
of the decision for capital account liberalization. This encompasses the case of Mexico,
where some domestic political consensus was finally forged by the newly formed tech-
nocratic government to advance with the country’s membership into NAFTA. Since the
freedom of capital movements was an important requirement of that trade treaty, the deci-
sion to join NAFTA was instrumental to the disbanding of the stringent system of capital
controls. Elsewhere in the region, other idiosyncratic elements also played a role. This
was the case in Brazil in the early 1990s when, under the liberal orientation of presi-
dent Collor de Mello, trade and capital flows were liberalized as a political response to
the inefficiency of domestic monopolies, aiming to grant nationals wider access to lower
cost/higher quality imported goods and broader opportunities to allocate their savings.4
These considerations suggest that capital account restrictions are exogenous to macroe-
conomic covariates, such as the domestic business cycle and the capital inflow cycle in
different countries. These considerations are also consistent with econometric tests pre-
sented in Fernández et al. (2015) supporting the hypothesis that capital controls have been
strikingly a-cyclical in the broad cross-country panel that they examine. Accordingly, it
3For further break-downs of the index by region, sub-indices and sub-periods, see Fernández et al.
(2016).
4See Trubek et al. (2013).
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is also reasonable to assume that capital control decisions are mainly exogenous to bank-
ing sector behavior, greatly aiding the econometric identification of the effects of external
financial liberalization on banks’ funding decisions. Furthermore, even if this were not
the case, the identification strategy underlying our regression analysis, by hinging on the
heterogeneity of banks at the micro-level, would ensure the robustness of our results to
possible biases arising from the (remaining) endogeneity of capital control regulations to
banking sector indicators (see Section 5.1 for further discussion).
3 Data
3.1 Bank-Level Data
Our annual bank-level data spans the 1995-2013 period and the following 17 Latin Amer-
ican countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,5 Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay and Venezuela.6
The variables are constructed from information provided in Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope
database. We mostly include unconsolidated balance sheet data (i.e., Bankscope codes U1
and U2) because consolidated statements might be affected by foreign subsidiaries.7 Af-
ter some data cleaning with regard to mergers and implausible observations (e.g., negative
equity or liabilities), we obtain a sample of 8,293 bank-year observations.8
Table 1: The Distribution of Banks in our Sample over Time
1995 2000 2005 2010 2013
number of banks 123 463 399 589 569
Table 1 presents the number of financial institutions over time. Bankscope coverage is
lower for the 1990s relative to the 2000s, which results in a lower number of banks in our
5Excluding Panama—which serves as a financial center—does not affect our estimates.
6Three Latin American countries (Cuba, Honduras and Puerto Rico) are not covered because of missing
data on their degree of external financial openness. We start our sample period in 1995 because both our
bank-level data and the measure of capital account openness (the de-jure index of Fernández et al., 2016)
are not available before.
7When banks only report consolidated statements, we include these in our regressions.
8We lose 686 observations because of the merger correction. Moreover, 474 implausible observations
are dropped.
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Table 2: The Distribution of Banks in our Sample across Countries


















data set for 1995-1999. As we will show in the sensitivity analysis presented in Section
8, we obtain qualitatively similar results for time sub-periods with a relatively constant
number of banks. Further, Table 2 shows that most banks in our sample are located in the
three largest economies of Latin America—Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
We use this rich bank-level data set to break down bank liabilities into equity (CAPITAL),
retail deposits (DEPOSIT S), interbank funding (INT ERBANK), other short-term debt
(OT HER SHORT −T ERM DEBT ),9 bonds (BONDS)10 and non-interest bearing liabil-
ities (NON − INT EREST FUNDS), all expressed as ratios relative to total assets.
Our bank-level data set further contains various explanatory variables that are likely
to affect banks’ funding structures. These include bank size (SIZE), defined as the log-
arithm of total assets, the ratio of impaired loans less reserves for impaired loans as a
proxy for bank risk (RISK) and the share of non-interest income over gross revenues
(NONINT EREST INCOME).
9This variable includes all short-term liabilities that are not interbank loans or retail deposits. For in-
stance, it includes money market funds and corporate deposits.
10This variable basically includes all traded liabilities. However, long-term bonds with a share of 92% in
all traded liabilities, are by far the most critical component.
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3.2 Macroeconomic Data
Our main regressor is the degree of capital account openness, proxied by the Schindler
inflow index (Fernández et al., 2016). It is a new de-jure index of external financial liber-
alization, measuring the strength of capital controls imposed by national authorities based
on the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
The index is calculated from 1995 to 2013 as the average of ten disaggregated inflow re-
strictions on single asset categories and takes the values between zero (fully liberalized)
and one. In our model, LIBERALIZAT ION is calculated as (1-Schindler inflow index)
because—due to this transformation—higher values represent external financial liberal-
ization, facilitating the interpretation of our results. There are two key advantages of this
index. First, it is a de-jure measure of international financial integration. This is benefi-
cial relative to de-facto measures (such as capital flows) because the de-jure measure is
predominantly determined at the aggregate policy level and is arguably more exogenous
to banks’ funding structures. Second, the index by Fernández et al. (2016) reports the
openness of capital in- and outflows separately. For the analysis of this paper, focusing
on inflow restrictions is beneficial because inflows of foreign capital are likely to be more
important than capital outflows in affecting the dynamics of banks’ funding structures.
Apart from the external financial liberalization measure, we also merge different macroe-
conomic variables to our bank-level data. Following Dinger and von Hagen (2009) and
Gropp and Heider (2010), we expand our data set by real PPP adjusted per capita GDP
(PERCAPITAGDP), the percent change in the consumer price index to control for the
high inflation rates in many Latin American countries (INFLAT ION) and the real GDP
growth rate (GROWT H). We further include the VIX as an additional covariate because
it has been shown to be a good proxy for the international supply of capital, especially so
in emerging market regions (e.g., Baskaya et al., 2017). Our macroeconomic data set also
includes the unemployment rate, stock market volatility, the rule of law, the regulatory
reserve and capital requirements and sovereign debt. Yet, as these variables turned out to
be statistically insignificant in most of the regressions, we exclude them from the set of
macro controls in the regression specifications reported in the remainder of this paper.11
11The insignificance of capital requirements is consistent with earlier research of Gropp and Heider
(2010), who show that capital regulation only has a second order importance in determining banks’ capital
9
Table A.1 (Appendix) provides further specifics of the data.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 summarizes the main descriptive statistics of the bank-level and macroeconomic
variables in our model. The median bank has a capital-to-asset ratio of 12%, a deposit
share of almost 59% and an interbank ratio of about 5%. These numbers show that,
compared with advanced economies, banks in emerging markets fund a higher proportion
of their balance sheet with equity and customer deposits, while interbank funding has a
lower importance.12 In addition, other short-term debt has a median share of 4.6%, bonds
of 3.6%, and non-interest funding of 3.3%.13
Turning to the other bank-level variables, Table 3 shows that the arithmetic mean of
the variable RISK (defined as impaired loans less loan loss reserves over total equity) is
equal to 5.1%, implying that, for the average Latin American bank, impaired loans exceed
reserves for loan losses. There are also several banks with significant amounts of impaired
loans, outstripping 27% of their equity (90th percentile). Further, the low median ratio
of non-interest income (25.93%) points to the fact that banks’ business models in Latin
America are focused on financial intermediation, so that interest income is the main source
of revenue. The share of non-interest income over gross revenues in advanced economies
is significantly higher and equal to 40% (e.g., DeYoung and Rice, 2004).
Our main regressor, capital account openness, has a median value of 0.80. Thus, the
average bank operates in a country which is externally relatively open. Yet, as pointed
out before, the cross-country variation in this variable is far-reaching, including countries
that are fully shielded from foreign capital (LIBERALIZAT ION=0) and countries which
are fully open (LIBERALIZAT ION=1).
The values for per capita GDP in our sample vary substantially with a 10th percentile
of 5,350 USD and a 90th percentile of 17,160 USD. The median inflation rate equals
5.79%. Non-trivial inflation stresses the great importance of controlling for changes in
price levels, as they are likely to affect our estimates. Finally, the average real GDP
structures.
12In the euro area, for instance, the average share of customer deposits is equal to 30-40%, wholesale
funding has a share of 20-30% and capital ratios are equal to about 6-8% (ECB, 2016).
13The numbers do not add up to 100 because Bankscope does not report all six variables for every bank.
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growth rate is equal to almost 4% and the VIX takes a median value of 22.55%.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Obs. Unit 10th Median Mean 90th SD
CAPITAL 8278 % 6.64 11.98 17.57 34.51 16.49
DEPOSITS 7638 % 8.94 58.68 52.16 81.64 26.04
INTERBANK 6677 % 0 4.75 11.17 31.73 15.49
OTHER SHORT-TERM DEBT 6239 % 0 4.59 11.40 33.58 15.85
BONDS 7107 % 0 3.61 10.25 29.50 16.00
NON-INTEREST FUNDS 8259 % 0.57 3.33 6.08 13.51 9.18
SIZE 8278 ln(x) 3.49 6.12 6.18 8.94 2.10
RISK 8278 % -13.85 -0.39 5.10 27.58 30.98
NONINTERESTINCOME 8200 % 2.09 25.89 30.34 66.71 37.06
LIBERALIZATION 8278 - 0.2 0.80 0.68 1.00 0.32
PERCAPITAGDP 8278 - 5.35 11.39 11.27 17.16 4.29
INFLATION 8275 % 2.27 5.79 8.51 16.21 9.65
GROWTH 8278 % -0.61 3.92 3.72 8.22 3.65
VIX 8278 % 12.81 22.55 21.64 31.48 5.99
The first six variables (the dependent variables employed in our analysis) are the bank-level shares of capital,
retail deposits, interbank loans, other short-term debt, bonds, and non-interest funds in total assets. The three
bank controls added to all regressions are bank size (log of total assets), the share of impaired loans in equity
and non-interest income over gross revenues. The macro covariates are the Schindler capital account inflows
index, as well as per capita GDP, the inflation rate, real GDP growth and the VIX.
4 Funding Dynamics: Macro Evidence
This section presents the macro-level dynamics of banks’ funding structures around cap-
ital account liberalization events, defined as at least a one-sd increase (and no less than
a 10-basis points change) in a country’s de-jure capital account openness index by Fer-
nández et al. (2016).14 We obtain the aggregate banking sector variables by summing up
14For symmetry reasons, we also examined the macro-level dynamics of banks’ funding structures around
capital account de-liberalization events. We do not plot them both because they may not be as representative
since there are only five de-liberalization events (where the year-to-year increase in capital controls was no
less than one standard deviation) and because these events were concentrated around the global financial
crisis of 2008-09. While a symmetric time profile holds for interbank funding (i.e., during de-liberalizations,
resort to interbank funding falls), we do not observe the symmetric rise in equity ratios, likely because equity
market conditions sharply deteriorated during and in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, making it more
expensive for banks to issue equity to fill in for limited interbank borrowing. This is no concern in our
multivariate regressions, which control for these effects via the VIX and other macro controls that capture
the crisis role in the dynamics of equity ratios.
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the bank-level observations (from the Bankscope database) for every country and year.
This procedure is justified by the fact that Bankscope data for Latin America is highly
representative of the entire banking system. The aggregate total assets from Bankscope
cover between 67% (Uruguay) and 100% (Panama) of the total assets provided in the
International Financial Statistics (with an average coverage of 81%).
Figure 2: Figure 2 depicts the annual dynamics of the banking sectors’ equity-to-assets
ratio, deposits-to-assets ratio, interbank loans-to-assets ratio, other short-term debt-to-
assets ratio, bonds-to-assets ratio and non-interest funding-to-assets ratio around external
financial liberalization events, defined as at least a one-sd increase in a country’s capital
account openness index by Fernández et al. (2016). The vertical lines display the year of
the external financial liberalization event.
Figure 2 depicts the relevant snapshots. There is prima facie evidence that interna-
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tional financial liberalization leads to (i) a one-pp decrease in capital ratios from 10.5%-
11% to 9.5%-10%; and (ii) an increase in banks’ shares of interbank funding from 4%
to 6%-8%.15 The ratios of retail deposits, in contrast, are unaffected by capital account
liberalization, as are the other liability side variables (bonds, other short-term debt and
non-interest funding), which exhibit a clear downward trend that is not altered by the
events.
Figure 3: Figure 3 depicts the annual dynamics of gross banking sector capital inflows
over GDP, the inflation rate, the real money market rate and the spread between money
market and deposit interest rates around external financial liberalization events, defined
as a at least one-sd increase in a country’s capital account openness index by Fernández
et al. (2016). The vertical lines display the year of the external financial liberalization
event.
The rise in interbank borrowing relative to other sources of funds, and particularly to
domestic deposits, in turn raises the question on the composition of interbank funding.
While Bankscope data does not allow breaking down interbank funding by domestic and
15As interbank funding can be very volatile, in order to reduce the impact of outliers, we drop observa-
tions where the interbank ratio has changed by more than 100% (but at least 5 percentage points) from one
year to the other. The general dynamics are unaffected by this correction.
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foreign sources, there are indications that much of the interbank funding is fed by foreign
borrowing—either in the form of borrowing from related offshore banks or by a rise in
domestic interbank market liquidity due to capital inflows. This conjecture is corroborated
by the northwest panel of Figure 3, which shows that gross foreign borrowing by banks
typically trend up in the wake of capital account liberalization. Declining inflation and
lower real money market interest rate are also likely contributors to greater buoyancy
in the interbank market, in turn reflecting higher capital inflows. No less importantly,
the decline in the money market-deposit interest spread in the wake of external financial
liberalization is bound to incentivize banks to substitute interbank funding for deposits,
consistent with waning importance of the latter relative to the former once controls on
capital inflows are loosed.16
In what follows, we build on this prima facie evidence by examining these associa-
tions at the micro-level. Apart from aiding econometric identification, the main advantage
of the micro-level dimension of our data set is that of shedding new light on the effects
across different types of banks, including large vs. small, domestic vs. foreign-owned and
those with opaque vs. less opaque balance sheets. This breakdown by banks’ character-
istics is clearly important for better understanding of the channels through which capital
account liberalization affects systemic fragility and, hence, for the design of prudential
regulations.
5 Funding Dynamics: Micro Evidence
5.1 Econometric Specification
We examine the relationship between changes in capital account regulations and banks’
funding structures using the following model:
FUNDINGi jt = αi + γ ∗FUNDINGi, j,t−1 +β ∗LIBERALIZAT ION jt +θ ∗Xi jt + εi jt (1)
16As the spread between money market and deposit rates can be very volatile, in order to reduce the
impact of outliers, we drop observations where it has changed by more than 100% (but at least 5 percentage
points) from one year to the other. The general dynamics are unaffected by this correction.
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The dependent variables in equation (1) are the shares of capital, retail deposits, inter-
bank funding, other short-term debt, bonds or non-interest liabilities over total assets of
bank i in country j at time t. As is apparent from Figure 2, the aggregate behavior of
these variables is suggestive of non-trivial autocorrelation. It therefore seems important
to include the lagged dependent variables on the right hand side of equation (1) to help
capture the time-series dynamics of banks’ funding structures.17 The coefficient αi is an
individual bank intercept and the vector X includes the bank-level and macroeconomic
controls listed in Table 3. The main coefficient of interest in the following analysis is β ,
which measures the short-run impact of external financial liberalization on banks’ funding
ratios. The long-run effects are given by β1−γ .
OLS yields inconsistent estimates in the presence of individual bank-specific effects.
If we simply replace pooled OLS with fixed effects regressions, the estimates may also
be non-trivially biased by the presence of the lagged dependent variable once the panel’s
time series dimension is not too large (Nickel, 1981). To overcome these issues, we es-
timate the equation with the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond,
1998),18 which uses both the variable levels as instruments for the equation in first differ-
ences and, additionally, first differences of the variables as instruments for the variables
in levels. The existing literature on the determinants of firms’ liability structures shows
that the Blundell-Bond estimator is superior to the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano
and Bond, 1991), in particular because of the high persistence of the dependent variables
(e.g., Faulkender et al., 2012; Flannery and Hankins, 2013).
We instrument the regressors with five lags of their levels and first differences, re-
spectively.19 Restricting the number of instruments is important because they increase
quadratically in T and, therefore, can become very large, overfitting endogenous vari-
ables (Roodman, 2009b). The standard errors are corrected by the procedure proposed by
Windmeijer (2005). This procedure addresses the potential downward bias of the standard
errors that arises when using a large number of instruments in a regression. Its application
makes our t-statistics more conservative, leading to more reliable inference.
The regressions are weighted by banks’ total assets. This is important in order to
17This is standard, among others, in Faulkender et al. (2012).
18We rely on the xtabond2 command in Stata (Roodman, 2009a) to estimate these regressions.
19The results are robust to other lag specifications.
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adjust our estimates for the oversampling of small banks, which are less of a concern
from a financial stability/systemic risk perspective. In addition, it aligns the micro-level
results with the previous evidence on aggregate bank funding dynamics—large banks also
play a greater role in the aggregate amounts of bank funding.
Following the discussion of Section 2, we treat capital account openness as broadly
exogenous to domestic macroeconomic covariates. Yet, as an added insurance to the risk
that our results might be contaminated by some endogeneity bias arising from the ability
of the banking sector to affect capital account regulations (e.g., via political lobbying), we
further corroborate the causal interpretation of our results by estimating the above equa-
tion with the Blundell-Bond estimator, but instrumenting the degree of capital account
openness with a government’s partisanship indicator and an IMF program dummy, both
of which are exogenous to external financial liberalization and likely to be significant
drivers of the latter (Section 8).
In addition, even if capital account openness were to be endogenous at the macro-level
or at the level of the consolidated banking system, our identification also relies on the het-
erogeneity of banks at the micro-level, as some of our empirical tests explore the differ-
ences across banks based on an interaction between a country and a bank characteristic.
Thus, even if omitted variables at the country-level correlate with LIBERALIZAT ION,
inter-bank differences in the sensitivity with respect to external financial liberalization
should not be affected. Examining the cross-bank sensitivity to capital account regula-
tions also allows us to improve the understanding of how international financial liberal-
ization transmits to changes in banks’ funding ratios—an advantage relative to studies
relying purely on macro-level data.
16
5.2 Baseline Results
As is apparent from Table 4, capital account openness is associated with reductions in
banks’ capital ratios and higher ratios of interbank funding. Retail deposits, other short-
term debt, bonds and non-interest liabilities, in contrast, are not affected significantly by
external financial liberalization. This micro-level evidence is consistent with the aggre-
gate bank funding dynamics established in Section 4.
In economic terms, an increase in the external financial liberalization index by one
standard deviation (about 0.32 in our sample) reduces the capital-to-asset ratios on im-
pact by 0.31 pp. The long-run effect is equal to 1.1 pp, as can be gauged by dividing
the coefficient of LIBERALIZAT ION by (1-autoregressive coefficient). This is an eco-
nomically significant effect since earlier research finds even smaller reductions in banks’
equity ratios to increase the probability of bank distress significantly. For instance, the
ECB (2015) finds that a one-pp increase in the Tier 1 capital ratios reduces the odds ratio
(that is, the probability of distress relative to non-distress) by 35-39% (see also Altunbas
et al., 2014). Turning to the economic significance of interbank borrowing, Table 4 in-
dicates that a one-sd increase in external financial liberalization raises banks’ interbank
loans by 0.38 pp in the short-run; the long-run effect is equal to 2.6 pp.
Banks’ funding structures are also affected significantly by the set of bank-level con-
trols. In particular, larger banks have lower equity ratios and less retail deposits. Risky
banks and banks with lower non-interest income are also characterized by lower equity
ratios. These results are consistent with earlier findings by Gropp and Heider (2010) or
George (2015), among others.
From the macroeconomic covariates, especially inflation rate differences affect banks’
funding structures: a high inflation rate tends to lower banks’ capital ratios and to raise
the shares of retail deposits (which are typically of shorter maturities). Higher global
uncertainty (higher VIX) is also associated with lower capital-to-asset ratios. Overall,
in line with Gropp and Heider (2010), we find most other macroeconomic factors to be





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In columns (1)-(6), the lagged dependent variables are highly statistically significant
with a coefficient between 0.71 (for equity ratios) and 0.93 (for retail deposits). Therefore,
retail deposits are more sticky (have higher autocorrelation) than other types of funding
(especially capital and other short-term debt). These estimates further imply an adjust-
ment speed (1-autoregressive coefficient) of 7%-29%. An adjustment speed of about
30% for banks’ capital-to-asset ratios is consistent with that obtained by Faulkender et al.
(2012) and suggests that bank capital ratios adjust quickly.
In summary, the results of Section 5.2 suggest that external financial liberalization
only affects banks’ equity and interbank ratios significantly. In the remainder of this paper,
we will therefore expand on this result and focus on the capital-to-asset ratio and interbank
funding as the dependent variables. We further include the share of retail deposits in all of
the following regressions because of its overwhelming weight on banks’ balance sheets
(with a median value of almost 59% in total assets). The results for the other variables are
readily available upon request.
5.3 Controlling for the On- vs. Off-Shore Interest Spread
We have previously shown that capital account openness leads to more interbank funding
and less equity. This result is consistent with the notion that, in the wake of external finan-
cial integration, short-term debt flows are the dominant form of cross-border capital flows
to emerging economies (e.g., Henry, 2007; Kose et al., 2009). Foreign investors, how-
ever, should provide disproportionately more short-term funding (i.e., interbank loans) to
banks in emerging market regions the lower is the world interest rate. In this sub-section,
we therefore expand the baseline analysis by testing whether external financial openness
affects the funding structures of banks disproportionately more during periods of high
real domestic money market interest rate spreads relative to the world’s main financial
center—the US. Since money market rates are mainly driven by the stance of monetary
policy, the following analysis also allows us to analyze the interaction of capital account





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































To this end, the following analysis splits the sample into episodes in which the real
domestic money market rate relative to the US is in the upper half of the distribution and
those in which it is in the lower half.20
The attendant results are in line with our hypothesis, indicating that LIBERALIZAT ION
has economically and statistically more significant effects during episodes of high do-
mestic money market spreads (columns (4)-(6)). Economically, a one-sd increase in
LIBERALIZAT ION during these episodes raises the interbank funding ratios by 0.46 pp
in the short-run and by 3.4 pp in the long-run. The reduction in banks’ equity ratios is
equal to 0.42 pp on impact (1.6 pp in the long-run). These effects are 20%-40% larger
than our baseline estimates.
In a nutshell, we document that the effects of external financial liberalization on banks’
funding structures are influenced by the stance of monetary policy at home and abroad.
When money market rates in international financial centers relative to emerging market
economies are low, capital account liberalizations in the latter are associated with a dis-
proportionate decrease in equity and higher interbank funding. These results therefore
add to the findings of recent work on the cross-border spill-overs of US monetary pol-
icy (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 2012; Bruno and Shin, 2015a; Ioannidou et al., 2015;
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015; Baskaya et al. 2017; Cerutti et al., 2017; Buch et
al., 2018), highlighting also a significant link between monetary policy in the US and the
liability composition of banks in peripheral economies.
6 Are the Results Driven by Informationally Less Opaque
Banks?
Following capital account liberalization, foreign investors mainly provide short-term debt
funding, rather than equity, to borrowers in emerging markets (e.g., Henry, 2007; Kose
et al., 2009). This result is attributed to asymmetric information between both parties.
Due to such information asymmetries, the extant literature on the capital structures of
non-financial corporates further shows that international/distant lenders prefer borrowers
with rich information available to outside stakeholders (e.g., Lucey and Zhang, 2011). In
20The data on money market rates comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
21
Section 6, we test whether this evidence on firms also applies to banks, i.e., whether cap-
ital account openness also benefits informationally less opaque banks disproportionately
more. As these tests explore the differences across banks based on an interaction be-
tween a country (capital account openness) and a bank characteristic, the corresponding
estimates are less sensitive to the underlying rationale for external financial liberaliza-
tion, thus strengthening the causal interpretation of our coefficients. For instance, even
if unobservable macroeconomic variables correlate with LIBERALIZAT ION, inter-bank
differences in the sensitivity with respect to external financial liberalization should not be
affected.
As many empirical studies use size as a proxy for information availability, our first
test explores the nexus between external financial integration and funding ratios con-
ditional on bank size. If international investors tend to prefer lending to information-
ally less opaque banks, we should find a stronger effect of LIBERALIZAT ION on the
funding structures of large banks. For the identification of this hypothesis, we enable
LIBERALIZAT ION to interact with banks’ total assets. As our regressions are already
weighted by banks’ total assets, this test basically examines whether, within the weighted
sample of large banks, the largest financial institutions are affected most significantly by
capital account liberalization. Attendant results, shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table 6,
are consistent with the aforementioned evidence on firms, indicating that especially the
shares of equity and interbank funding of the largest banks are affected by capital account
liberalization. The difference between smaller and the largest banks with respect to their
sensitivity to external financial integration is not only statistically significant, but also
economically important: a one-sd increase in LIBERALIZAT ION raises the shares of in-
terbank loans of the median bank on impact by 0.08 pp; the same effect for the largest
banks at the 99th percentile of the distribution of total assets is equal to 0.35 pp. As a
consequence, the long-run effect for the largest banks is also more than four times larger
than the corresponding effect for the median bank (2.7 pp vs. 0.6 pp). In addition, the
largest 1% of banks also have 0.9 pp lower long-run equity ratios than the median bank





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thus, capital account liberalization and the improved access to foreign funding mainly
affects the largest banks—a result broadly consistent with Baskaya et al. (2017), who find
the impact of capital flows into emerging markets (Turkey) on credit growth to increase
with banks’ total assets.
In the next set of tests, we corroborate the role of asymmetric information across
banks by examining whether the effects of LIBERALIZAT ION are amplified in foreign-
owned banks, assuming that foreign ownership reduces the informational frictions be-
tween global investors and banks. For this analysis, we define foreign-owned banks as
banks whose equity is to at least 50% owned by a foreign institution, using the own-
ership data provided in Claessens and van Horen (2014).21 Columns (4)-(6) document
that the effect of LIBERALIZAT ION is indeed conditional on banks being foreign or
domestically-owned, revealed by the significant interaction term between LIBERALIZAT ION
and FOREIGN for two of the three dependent variables. In particular, external financial
liberalization especially reduces the equity ratios of foreign-owned banks. In addition,
column (5) documents that domestic banks have higher shares of retail funding in the
wake of capital account openness (the LIBERALIZAT ION coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant at the 10% level); foreign-owned banks, in contrast, have less retail funding.22
The previous two exercises suggest that foreign investors overproportionally take po-
sitions in Latin American banks with a lower degree of asymmetric information—large
and foreign-owned banks. Following this evidence, we finally allow the external financial
liberalization index to interact with the ratio of impaired loans relative to equity, a fre-
quently used measure for the opaqueness of bank balance sheets.23 We hypothesize that
a more opaque balance sheet also increases the information asymmetries between domes-
tic banks and international investors, thus reducing the effects of LIBERALIZAT ION on
banks’ funding structures. Columns (7)-(9) support this hypothesis: whereas the short-
run effect of a one-sd increase in LIBERALIZAT ION on the interbank ratios of banks at
the 25th percentile of the distribution of asset risk is equal to 0.51 pp, its effect on banks
21We have hand-collected information on the foreign ownership status of banks that are not covered by
the data set of Claessens and van Horen (2014).
22This is the sum of LIBERALIZAT ION and LIBERALIZAT ION ∗FOREIGN.
23See Jungherr (2016). A higher share of impaired loans generally signals that the bank is prone to
funding more opaque projects, whose values are subject to substantial degrees of asymmetric information
(and, hence, whose recovery of principal and interest, once they fall in default, is also subject to greater
uncertainty).
24
with impaired loans at the 75th percentile is only equal to 0.3 pp. The long-run difference
in interbank ratios between both types of banks is even more pronounced (3.4 pp vs. 2
pp). This result suggests that the interaction term is not only statistically, but also eco-
nomically significant. Columns (7)-(9) further show that LIBERALIZAT ION has more
muted effects on the equity ratios of more opaque banks. Overall, the results presented in
this section thus indicate that the effects of external financial integration are amplified in
banks with a lower degree of asymmetric information.
7 How Does Capital Account Liberalization Affect Small
Banks?
Table 7 depicts the size distribution of banks in our data set. It shows that 90% of (smaller)
banks have a combined asset share of less than 21%. In contrast, the largest 5% of banks
in our sample have a combined asset share of 66.5%. As we weighted all of the previous
regressions by banks’ total assets, we identified—to a great extent—the implications of
capital account liberalization for the largest 5% of banks.
In this section, we document whether and through which channels external financial
openness also affects small banks’ funding dynamics, which is important because small
banks are typically the main provider of credit to small/more opaque non-financial firms
(Berger and Udell, 2002). To this end, we refrain from weighting the observations by total
assets in the regressions presented in Table 8.
Table 7: The Distribution of Banks by Total Assets






This table presents the number of bank-year observations for different bank
size classes and the corresponding share of assets held by the particular size
class (e.g. the first row shows the number of observations of the smallest 50
percent of banks in our sample, as well as their total assets relative to aggre-
gate total assets of the whole banking system).
25
Unlike our baseline analysis, capital account openness leads to significantly higher
shares of retail deposits (column (2)) and lower interbank ratios (column (3)) for small
banks. These effects are also economically significant: in the long-run, the shares of retail
funding increase by 4.2 pp and banks’ interbank ratios decrease by 1.5 pp in the wake of
a one-sd increase in LIBERALIZAT ION.
The rise in interbank borrowing for the largest banks and higher retail deposits for
small banks, in turn, raise the question on the transmission of global liquidity to the
different types of banks. We conjecture that, in response to the lower relative cost of
foreign and interbank borrowing (see Section 4), large banks lower their deposit interest
rate relative to that of smaller banks, inducing deposit flows to the latter and, thus, making
the latter more dependent on retail funding.24
To verify this hypothesis, we continue regressing the average country-level spread of
small banks’ deposit interest rate, defined as banks in the lowest 95% of the country-
specific distribution of total assets, relative to that of large banks (in the top 5% of the
distribution) on the measure of capital account liberalization, controlling for country fixed
effects.25 Column (4) shows that external financial liberalization induces large banks to
lower their deposit interest rate relative to that of smaller banks, indicated by a positive
coefficient on LIBERALIZAT ION, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. In
economic terms, a one-sd increase in external financial openness raises the relative deposit
rate of small banks (or reduces the relative deposit rate of large banks) by 2.1 pp, which
is non-trivial given a median deposit interest rate of 7.4% in our sample. Overall, we
therefore establish that small banks benefit indirectly from capital account openness via
an increased access to retail deposits.
24This hypothesis is broadly in line with the extant literature on the link between banks’ market power and
deposit rates, which shows that smaller (single-market) banks depend disproportionately more on customer
deposits and, as a result, attract retail funding by paying a higher relative deposit interest rate (e.g., Barros,
1999; Hannan and Prager, 2006; Park and Pennacchi, 2009).
25The results are robust to employing alternative thresholds to differentiate between small and large
banks. Due to few extreme outliers in the deposit spread of small banks, we drop values larger than 50%
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, we present several robustness checks. We start to alter the econometric
model by estimating equation (1) via ordinary least squares. As is apparent from Ta-
ble A.2, capital account openness is still associated with significantly higher interbank
funding ratios. Further, LIBERALIZAT ION also reduces banks’ capital ratios (though
the corresponding coefficient is not statistically significant). As in our baseline analy-
sis, there is no significant link between capital account openness and the shares of retail
deposits. Thus, our main results are broadly robust to OLS estimation.
Next, we estimate our model with the Blundell-Bond estimator, but instrument the
degree of capital account openness with a government’s partisanship indicator and an
IMF program dummy. As argued in Section 2, both variables are exogenous to external
financial liberalization and, additionally, significant drivers of the latter. We are thus able
to corroborate the identification of a causal relationship between capital account openness
and banks’ funding structures. Table A.3 corroborates our baseline estimates: a one-sd
increase in external financial liberalization in the short-term increases banks’ interbank
ratios by 0.42 pp and reduces banks’ capital ratios by 0.32 pp. Retail deposits, in contrast,
are not affected by external financial liberalization at conventional significance levels.
Finally, we adjust the time and bank coverage of our sample. In the time dimension,
we estimate equation (1) over two sub-samples. First, using the definitions provided in
Laeven and Valencia (2013), we restrict the sample period to non-crisis episodes to cir-
cumvent any variation in banks’ funding ratios that is purely driven by financial crises.
Second, we drop the years before 1999. Although we lose some variation in the inter-
national financial liberalization measure, this adjustment might be important because the
Bankscope database has a higher coverage for the period 1999-2013 (see Table 1).26 The
attendant results in Table A.4 show that external financial openness is still associated with
lower equity ratios and more interbank borrowing. In the bank dimension, we restrict
the sample to commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks, thus dropping,
for instance, governmental institutions from our data set, which might have a different
sensitivity to the effects of external financial integration. Table A.5 establishes that this
261999 is the first year where the number of banks exceeds 350.
28
adjustment does not change any of the coefficients significantly, implying that the dif-
ferent types of banks in our sample do not affect our baseline estimates. If anything,
restricting the sample to these three types of banks even raises the economic significance
of LIBERALIZAT ION with regard to interbank funding ratios (the coefficient increases
from 1.2 to 1.4).
9 Concluding Remarks
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that relates changes in capital account
controls to the funding structure of banks, employing bank-level data and a sizeable panel
of emerging market economies. Recent research on the effects of international financial
integration on the banking systems of emerging economies (see most notably Baskaya
et al., 2017) have focused on the asset side of banks, rather than on attendant changes
in the composition of bank liabilities. This paper shows that this neglect is unwarranted,
since relaxations of capital controls are associated with a substitution of interbank funding
for equity among large banks—an effect that dominates at the macro-level due to the
size concentration of the domestic banking systems in many emerging market economies.
We also show that substitution is also significant among foreign and informationally less
opaque banks. Further, such effects are stronger during low global interest rate episodes.
These findings complement and provide further support to some of the current wisdom
on how international financial integration can increase the propensity for financial insta-
bility. All else constant, the average bank will tend to increase its reliance on (short-term)
interbank funding with external financial integration. This result suggests that financial
institutions are more prone to rollover risks following post-liberalization surges in capital
inflows and large current account deficits. Whereas these findings should not be inter-
preted as a rejection of the many benefits from international financial integration, they
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LIBERALIZATION -0.385 0.968 1.204∗∗
(-1.24) (1.30) (2.41)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6877 6370 5383
These specifications are based on annual bank- level data for the period 1995-
2013. The dependent variables are the shares of capital, retail deposits and in-
terbank loans relative to total assets. The key regressor is the degree of capital
account openness, proxied by the index of Fernández et al. (2016). We further
include bank-level (the logarithm of total assets, the fraction of impaired loans
and non- interest income over gross revenue) and macro (per capita GDP, VIX
inflation and GDP growth) controls. All the regressions are weighted by banks’
total assets and estimated via OLS. The t-statistics are presented in parentheses
employing heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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LIBERALIZATION -0.985∗∗∗ 0.593 1.326∗∗
(-2.84) (0.84) (2.21)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6877 6370 5383
These specifications are based on annual bank- level data for the period 1995-
2013. The dependent variables are the shares of capital, retail deposits and in-
terbank loans relative to total assets. The key regressor is the degree of capital
account openness, proxied by the index of Fernández et al. (2016). We further
include bank-level (the logarithm of total assets, the fraction of impaired loans
and non- interest income over gross revenue) and macro (per capita GDP, VIX
inflation and GDP growth) controls. All the regressions are weighted by banks’
total assets and estimated with the Blundell-Bond estimator; however, we instr-
ument capital account openness with an IMF program dummy and partisanship
indicators. We correct the standard errors by the method of Windmeijer (2005).
The t-statistics are shown in parentheses.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LIBERALIZATION -0.852∗∗∗ 0.862 1.403∗∗
(-3.26) (1.16) (2.55)
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs 5641 5482 4542
These specifications are based on annual bank- level data for the period 1995-
2013. The dependent variables are the shares of capital, retail deposits and in-
terbank loans relative to total assets. The key regressor is the degree of capital
account openness, proxied by the index of Fernández et al. (2016). We further
include bank-level (the logarithm of total assets, the fraction of impaired loans
and non- interest income over gross revenue) and macro (per capita GDP, VIX
inflation and GDP growth) controls. All the regressions are weighted by banks’
assets and estimated employing the Blundell- Bond estimator. However, we re-
strict the sample to commercial, savings and cooperative banks. We correct the
standard errors by the method of Windmeijer (2005). The t-statistics are shown
in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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